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I 
In light of the recent controversy surrounding the validity of race conscious 
redistricting, the practice of creating congressional districts with an African 
American or Hispanic majority population, an important question arises; are the 
votes of African American congresspersons even critical to the passage of policy I issues salient to the African American populace. This study seeks to prove that the 
votes of African American congresspersons are crucial to the passage of House I policy issues salient to the African American community. To prove this hypothesis 
this study analyzed the voting cohesion and pivotal voting bloc influence of each 
I 
I Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) member of both the lO2nd and l03rd Congress on 
policy issues deemed salient to the black community per the CBC' "Black Agenda". 
The object is to determine whether the votes of the lO2nd and l03rd Caucuses, 
played an essential role in the passage of policy issues salient to African Americans. 
Non-CBC Democrat cohesion was also examined pertaining to these issue in orderI to ascertain the level of support non-CBC Democrats gave in the House passage of 
the corresponding issues. The finding demonstrate not only are the votes of CBCI members necessary, but more African American Congresspersons, who are sensitive 
to black issues and who are willing to vote cohesively with the CBC, are needed to 
I seriously promote and preserve policy issues of most importance to African 
Americans. 
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Race Redistricting and the Congressional Black Caucus ­I Who needs em'!?: Gauging the Essentiality of African 
American Congresspersons 
I 
I 
The year was 1993, twelve southern blacks settled into their newly 
elected congressional seats, raising the number of seats held by African 
Americans Democrats from 26 of 269 Democrats in the House in the 102nd 
Congress to 38 Of 258 in the 103rd U.S. Congress. For almost a century I African Americans were absent from the southern congressional 
delegations of North Carolina, Alabama, Florida, South Carolina and 
I Virginia; they were absent from Louisiana's congressional delegations 
I 
until 1991, Mississippi until 1987, Tennessee until 1975, and Georgia and 
Texas until 1973 (Higginbotham, Clarick, & David, 1994 ). Race 
redistricting, the practice of creating congressional districts with an 
African American or Hispanic majority population (Cohen, 1995), has made I it possible for African Americans, particularly in the South, to elect 
representatives of their choice, which in turn has given a political voiceI to the historically voiceless. It has made it possible for African American 
Representatives to swell the minority ranks of the U.S. Congress; which in 
I turn signaled the gneiss of a revitalized and influential Congressional 
I 
Black Caucus (CBC). 
Historically, African American members of Congress, have not only 
represented their district, but shouldered the hopes, needs, and desires of 
the entire African American community (Franklin & Moss, 1994; Lusane, I 1994). This political tradition started more than a century ago by the first 
black congressmen, Senator Hirim R. Revels of Mississippi and I Representative Joseph H. Rainey of South Carolina, and is still being 
perpetuated by more than 10,000 black elected officials throughout the 
I United States (Terkilden, 1993; Christopher, 1976). 
I 
Black representation in the current 104th Congressional Black 
Caucus totals forty-one members, with seventeen Representatives from 
the southern United States, one Republican Representatives, a delegate 
from the District of Columbia and one, Carol Mosely Braun of Illinois, inI the Senate. Although an all-time high, this is proportionately a modest 
I
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I number for the countries largest minority of nearly 34 million (Census Bureau, 1996; Mills, 1990). 
Prior to the 1990 round of redistricting, many argued that in orderI for black policy concerns to be nationally addressed, it was imperative to 
have black legislators to seriously promote these interests (Hatchett,I 1986). For generations African Americans were systematically ignored or 
depreciated in the arena of politics; minority majority districts were to 
I remedy this past discrimination. Based on the premise that white voters 
I 
are reluctant to vote for black political candidates, black majority 
districts were created to give African Americans an equally weighed vote 
in electing a representative of their choice (Terkildsen, 1993; Canon, 
1995). It was assumed that in drawing these race conscious districts, I blacks would chose someone who looked like them, on the premise that 
they would in accordance, preserve and promote public policy issues that I would have a positive impact on the African American community. 
Blacks representing blacks became a common theme that ran through
I the process of the 1990 redistricting efforts. Due to the CBC' acquired 
I 
image as national black leaders of the African American community, it 
was only natural for the majority of blacks to welcome additional 
advocates of black concerns to the Caucus. However, many found this 
codependency disturbing. The majority opinion in Reno v. Shaw (1993)I articulated by Justice O'Connor summed up the concerns of many outside 
of majority minority districts looking in when she declared "when aI district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common 
interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe 
I that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that 
I 
group, rather than their constituency"( 113 S. ct 2816, 1993). Many 
Americans agree with Justice 0' Connor's opinion and have engaged in 
Fierce debate and litigation in expousing their sentiments (Fein, 1993). 
The invalidation of the new minority majority district couldI possibly return the CBC' membership votes to its prior status. Many 
African Americans have expresses their outrage at the thought of losing I any of the minority majority district representatives; contending that the 
I
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I successful passage of legislation salient to African Americans is dependent upon the voice of the CBC, and a reduction in numbers could 
prove devastating to the black populous (Lusane, 1994). However one criticI finds it a racist assumption that race determines a voter's concern for a 
particular political issue and that blacks are ideologically monolithic on aI number of issues (Cohadas, 1994). That same author contend that "what 
some call 'black' issues such as AIDS, drug abuse, teenage pregnancy, 
I crime, welfare, health care, education or affirmative action", are not 
I 
concerns that can only be addressed by African Americans (Cohadas, 
1994).The 104th U.S. Congress' Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich has 
recently dealt a serious blow to the ability of the CBC and other subgroups 
to promote the interests of their particular constituencies. GingrichI achieved this by cutting budget appropriations for these caucuses in an 
effort to eliminate the divisive and pivotal influences these alliances mayI have in the House (Swain, 1996). 
In light of recent develops that threaten the survival of the CBC, the 
I important question becomes, are the votes of African American 
congresspersons even essential to the passage of policy issues salient to 
I the African American populous. To answer this question, this study 
examines the level of voting cohesion and pivotal voting bloc influence of 
each U.S. House Caucus and non-Caucus Democrat of both the 102nd and I	 103rd Congress on particular issues deemed salient to the Black 
community per the CSC' "Black Agenda" (Clay, 1992; CBC, 1975). The I object is to determine whether the votes of the 102nd and 103rd CBC 
members, play an essential (pivotal) role in the passage of policy issues 
I salient to African Americans. Non-CBC Democrat cohesion of U.S. House 
I 
members is also examined pertaining to these issue in order to ascertain 
the level of support non-CBC Democrats give in the passage of policy 
issues of particular concern to Black Americans. These two Congresses 
were chosen because of the dramatic effect minority majority I	 redistricting practices have had on CBC membership from the 102nd to the 
103rd congress. In order to explore this area successfully, this study I	 begins with a discussion of the constitutional and congressional 
provisions pertaining to the African American electorate and then moves 
I
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I to U.S. Supreme Court decisions on redistricting. A literature review pertaining to the voting cohesion and pivotal voting bloc influence of the 
CSC in general, is followed by this study's analysis of the CSC and non­I	 CSC House Democrat's voting cohesion and pivotal voting bloc influence on 
policy issues salient to the African American community. This paperI	 concludes with suggestions for future research pertaining to 
congressional
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
I
 
redistricting and minority representation . 
I 
I Congressional Black Caucus 
7 
I	 Constitutional and Congressional Provisions 
Constitutional AmendmentsI African American political participation began after the Civil War. 
Four million African Americans emerged from the shadows of slavery, I envigored with the possibility of freedom and justice (Franklin & Moss, 
1994). In the years just after the Civil War, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
I Amendments, with the help of federal legislation enforcing them, opened 
I 
the ballot box to recently freed African Americans. For a few years 
African Americans in the South, under the protection of the United States 
government, enjoyed the rights and privileges of democracy in 
approximately the same way as whites did. However, in the wake of the I	 1870s Post-Reconstruction era whites revolted against the new found 
power of the black electorate. Whites moved to limit and finally abolishI the democratic rights of African Americans. Mass chaos and terror were 
elected upon African Americans throughout the South after the 
I government withdrew its protections of African Americans. Starting in 
I 
the 1870s and continuing into the middle of this century, southern whites 
deployed a variety of tactics including violence, ballot-box fraud, poll 
taxes, literacy tests, appointed offices and the white primary to 
disenfranchise African Americans (Baer, 1983). The vast majority ofI	 southern African Americans were still denied the right to vote during the 
first half of this century. The voting barriers began to tumble down withI the assistance of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, 
ratified in January 1964, outlawing the requirement of poll taxes, long a 
I means of disfranchising blacks in the South (Franklin & Moss, 1993). But 
I 
African American continued to face Fierce opposition to their 
enfranchisement. 
Civil Rights ActsI African Americans sought relief of the political oppression they 
were experiencing, through the federal courts. However the court declinedI	 to involve itself in the business of the states. After intense pressure from 
civil rights advocates, violent unrest and fierce congressional debate, the 
I
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I Civil Rights Act of 1957 was enacted. This legislation opened up the court 
system to politically oppressed African Americans, by authorizing the 
federal government to bring civil suits in its name in order to obtainI injunctive relief in federal courts, when anyone was denied or threatened 
in his or her right to vote (Franklin & Moss, 1993). The Civil Rights Act of I 1960, strengthened its predecessor, to prevent evasive action by 
registrars, who failed to register qualified African American voters 
I solely on the bases of race (Franklin & Moss, 1993). The Civil Rights Act 
I 
of 1964 was the most far reaching of the Acts in support of racial 
equality ever enacted by Congress. It gave the attorney general additional 
power to protect citizens against discrimination and segregation in 
voting, education, and use of public facilities (Franklin & Moss, 1993). The I three Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 were enacted to curb the 
sundry practices ofI the Southern political system, but for the most part they proved 
unsuccessful (Grofman & Davidson, 1992). Although there was a notable 
I decline in voter discrimination, the period following the passage of the 
I 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was marked by strong resistance to its 
enforcement and considerable violence in some places. 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965I On August 6, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was signed into law 
(Grofman & Davidson, 1992). Its initial purpose was to do what the Civil I Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 could not effectively do, remove 
obstacles to voting. The main provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 
I as amended, include Section 4, outlawing educational requirements for 
I 
voting in states or counties where less than 50 percent of the voting age 
population had registered to vote as of November 1, 1964, or had voted in 
the 1964 presidential election (Foster, 1985). Section 6 and 7 of the Act 
give the Attorney General authority to assign federal registrars to enrollI	 voters (Foster, 1985). Section 2 creates a federal right of action to 
challenge vote dilution (Foster, 1985). Section 5 requires the U.S. DistrictI	 Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General to approve or 
I
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I 
'preclear' all changes in voting practices in jurisdictions with a history of 
discrimination (Foster, 1985). The preclearance requirement of sectionI 5 has covered all or part of twenty-two states over the past 30 years 
(Foster, 1985). Seven of the eleven states of the confederacy have been 
continuously covered by the acts provisions: Alabama, Georgia, I Mississippi, Louisiana, South Carolina, Virginia, and about half of the 
counties in North Carolina (Foster 1985). I In response to the City of Mobile v. Boldern 446 U.S. 55 (1980) 
decision, Congress passed the critically important 1982 amendment to 
I Section 2 prohibiting the drawing of electoral boundaries or the use of 
I 
other electoral devices that "result in a denial or abridgment of the 
rights .... to vote on account of race or color." The 1982 amendment also 
extended this element of the Voting Rights Act to all jurisdictions in the 
country ( Foster, 1985). I The impact of the amended Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act on the 
redistricting process was not intensely felt until the 1986 Thornburg v.I Gingles (478 U.S. 30, 1986) decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, which 
established the precedence for proving a Section 2 violation in federal 
I court (Weber, 1995). The essence of a Section 2 claim, centered on the 
I 
Court's opinion on dilution. The Court concluded that "unlawful dilution of 
the voting strength of racial minorities may be caused by the dispersal of 
blacks into districts in which they constitute an ineffective minority of 
voters or from the concentration of blacks into districts where theyI	 constitute an excessive majority" (Thornburg v. Gingles 487 U.S. 30, 
1986).This was seen by many in the political community as a warning to I states to create minority districts when ever possible. On the heels of the 
Supreme Courts interpretation in Gingles of the legal meaning of Section 
I 2, the Department of Justice (DOJ) arguable interpreted the Gingles 
I 
precedence as a signal for the DOJ to mandate more minority majority 
districts by relating amended Section 2 to extended Section 5 (Weber, 
1995). The result was the 1987 revised set of DOJ regulations governing 
covered Section 5 jurisdictions, mandating the drawing of a minorityI	 majority district in a covered state whenever voter dilution was in 
question (Weber, 1995). This interpretation of the post Gingles amendedI
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I Section 2 became the legal guideline used by the DOJ when it reviewed 
I 
congressional and state legislative plans submitted for the 1990s round 
of redistricting (Weber, 1995). 
Landmark U.S. Supreme Court RulingsI 
Redistricting
I	 While the federal judiciary has in recent years become a prominent, 
I 
player in the congressional redistricting process, for most of the nation's 
history the courts were content to be spectators, letting Congress set the 
ground rules. In the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, congressional 
redistricting was a "political thicket" (Covlegrove v. Green, 358 U.S. 1I	 (1946)that the courts should avoid. The Supreme Court by in large ignored 
the issue of redistricting. It was not until the early 1960s that largeI population disparities and a change in the ideology of the court, did the 
Court hesitantly entered the realms of the "political Thicket", and thus 
I began the judicial journey towards ensuring that the African American 
vote would have about the same impact as white votes. 
I Colegrove v. Green 
The Court had not serious entertained a redistricting suit since it ruled in 1932 
I invalidating a Mississippi legislative map, with lines drawn of unequal population ( Cain & 
I 
Butler, 1991). However, in the case of Colegrove v. Green, 358 U.S. 1 (1946) a challenge to 
the unequal population of Illinois districts was made and the Supreme Court undertook the 
I 
challenge. But the Supreme Court reaffirmed its laissez faire attitude towards redistricting by 
dismissing the case. Justice Frankfurter warned that redistricting is a "political thicket" that 
courts should avoid. 
Gomillion v. LightfootI	 White Americans in the Old Confederate states were genuinely fearful of flying under 
Black rule. In 1957 the white officials Tuskegee, Alabama attempted a drastic change in 
I electoral form to protect themselves from a possible African American majority. They 
I 
gerrymandered the town's boundaries to remove all but 12 of its 400 African American voters. 
In the case Gomillion v. Lightfoot 364 U.S. 339 (1960), the African American citizens of 
I 
Tuskegee argued that the gerrymander had the effect of disenfranchising them. The supreme 
Court struck down 
I
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I the gerrymandered district which began to lay the ground work for the Supreme Courts change 
of heart in entertaining the issue of redistricting. 
I Baker v. Carr 
I 
The Court's involvement in the 1962 Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186 (1962) decision 
declared that the Federal branch does have jurisdiction over the issue of malapportionment. 
Baker called for one person, one 
vote and equality of the opportunity to vote. This ruling is "responsible for the presence of I blacks in every state courthouse and in positions of power throughout the land especially the 
South," according to former Supreme Court Justice Brown (Texas Lawyer, 1990). TheBaker v. 
I Carr decision held that the claim of gross malapportionment of Tennessee's general assembly 
I 
denied equal protection due to vote dilution, presented a justifiable issue and, if discrimination 
is sufficiently shown, setting the precedent that each persons vote must count the same as his 
neighbor in every American election (Graham, 1972). 
I Grav v. Sanders The developing jurisprudence of Baker v. Carr found its most clear pronunciation in 
Gray v. Sanders 372 U.S. 368 (1963). The ruling in this Georgia case spells out in detail the I one person, one vote doctrine. Justice Douglas stated, "The conception of political equality from 
the declaration of Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth 
I and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing -- one person, one vote" (372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
I Wesberrv v. Sanders 
I
 
One year later involving another Georgia case, the Supreme Court of the United States,
 
in Wesberry v. Sanders 376 U.S. 1 (1964) was asked to determine whether the one person,
 
one vote doctrine pertaining to malapportionment in state legislatures also applied to the
 
Congress of the United States as well. The lower court in Georgia had dismissed the claim by
 I Wesberry that population disparities among Georgia congressional districts deprived voters of a
 
equally weighed vote. However Justice Black, writing for the Supreme Court majority held that
 
I Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution commands that as nearly as practicable, one person's vote
 
I
 
in a congressional election is to be worth as much as another's. The court threw out the Georgia
 
map that had not been changed since 1931.
 
I
 
Revnolds v. Sims
 
That same year in Reynolds v. Sims 377 U.S. 533 (1964) the principle of one person
 
one vote was extended to congressional constituencies. A U.S. Supreme Court ruling in the 
Alabama case rejected the argument that state senate districts, like the U.S. Senate, need not be I
 
I
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I apportioned on the basis of population. The decision required both upper and lower houses of 
I 
American state legislatures to be apportioned on the basis of population. The Supreme Court held 
that even a popular referendum favoring unequal populations in electoral districts could not 
supersede the individual voter's right to enjoy the constitutional one man, one vote principle. 
I David v. Bandemer 
In the case of David v. Bandemer 478 U.S. 109 (1986) the highest court in the land 
I declared for the first time that partisan gerrymanders are subject to legal challenge. But, the 
Court decides that the specific case before it, involving a GOP drawn legislative map in Indiana,
 
I did not constitute a partisan gerrymander.
 Shaw v. Reno
 
I
 The stream of progress that began to flow in the 1960s towards a just democracy for
 
I
 
African Americans seems to have diverted. In the case Shaw v. Reno 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993),
 
the Supreme Court ruled that the white plaintiffs had standing to challenge the North Carolina
 
congressional plan, as a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment Right, and remanded the case 
back to the lower court for trial. In announcing its decision in Shaw, a five to four majority of I the Court declared that a "plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatic irregular
 
shape, constitute an unconstitutional racial gerrymander" 113 S. Ct. at 2817 (1993). On
 
I remand, a three-judge federal district court panel ruled that the plan was a racial
 
I
 
gerrymander, but that North Carolina had a compelling state interest in complying with the
 
Voting Rights Act and remedying a history of past discrimination in voting, and that the state had
 
I
 
narrOWly tailored a plan to fulfill those state interests (Shaw v Hunt, 861 F Supp 408, ED.
 
NC., 1994). In other cases raising a Shaw claim, a three-judge panel in California upheld the
 
congressional plan as well as the state Senate and House plans drawn by the state Supreme Court
 
as not constituting illegal racial gerrymanders ( Dewitt v Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, ED.. Ca.,

I 1994), while congressional districts in Louisiana, Texas and Georgia were invalidated by a
 
three judge federal court using Shaw criteria.
 
I In the Hays v.. Louisiana (839 S. Ct. 2816, 1993), Vera v. Richards (861 F. Supp.
 
I
 
1304, S.D. Tex., 1994) and Johnson v. Miller (864 F. Supp. 1354, S.D. Ga., 1994) cases, the
 
three-judge panels agreed with Shaw that the equal protection claims were justifiable under
 
I
 
the 14th Amendment and that the burden of proof shifts to the state defendants to show that
 
racial gerrymandered plans were narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. The
 
states of Louisiana, Texas, and Georgia were unable to demonstrate their plans were narrowly 
tailored to meet a compelling state interest. Thus, courts voided the plans, and ordered the three I
 
I
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I 
state legislatures to come up with revised plans. All three states appealed the decisions to the 
I U.S. Supreme Court, with the Miller v. Johnson case being the first U.S. Suprem Court casualty of the post Shaw era. 
Miller v. Johnson_I The case of Miller v. Johnson U.S. 115 S. ct. 2475 (1995) was used by the Supreme 
Court to clarify its stand on racial gerrymandering set forth in Reno v. Shaw. In this case, the 
I Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the lower court of Georgia, ruling that redistricting lines 
could not be drawn solely on the basis of race. 
I The Shaw and Miller precedence and the increased judicial activism of the courts may 
lead to increased congressional and state legislative plan challenges throughout the remainder of 
I the 1990s. The Shaw and Miller decision broke down the standing barrier for white persons so that any oddly shaped district configuration and race based redistricting plans are likely to be 
I challenged in federal court under the 14th Amendment. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
I The Review of the Literature discusses briefly the historical background of the Congressional Black Caucus. Previous research on the 
cohesive tendencies of the CBC' roll call vote behavior is included asI background into the CBC' voting agreement on legislation salient to all 
Americans. Finally, previous research is provided pertaining to the CBC'I pivotal voting bloc influence. 
In the past, studies have focused on the voting cohesion of the 
I 
I Caucus in general. This study seeks to examine the CBC voting 
cohesiveness and pivotal voting bloc influence on policy issues pertaining 
particularly to the African American populace, to assess whether African 
I 
American congresspersons are essential to the passage of policy issues of 
particular concern to African Americans during these 102nd and 103rd 
Congresses. 
I Congressional Black Caucus 
For a majority of the CSC' life, it existed as a peripheral entity 
I within the U.S. House. The CSC, originally entitled the Democratic Select 
Committee, was later renamed the Congressional Black Caucus (Hatchett, 
I 1986). It was formed by Michigan Representative Charles Diggs and twelve 
I 
other congresspersons in 1969 (Hatchett, 1986). These thirteen 
individuals were compelled to operate as national spokes persons for more 
than 25 million disgruntled African American citizens (Clay, 1992). The 
committee's purpose was to facilitate communication between blackI members of the House and the chamber's leadership and to help fill the 
void left by the assassination of Dr. Martian Luther King Jr. (Hatchett,I 1986). The CSC was conceived in the height of the civil rights movement 
of the 1960s. The battle against racism and discrimination did not end at 
I the capital steps, instead it continued into the halls of Congress as the 
I 
eSc took on the self proclaimed role as the "conscious of the institution" 
(Canon, 1995). At a time of the 
I
 
I
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I "us against them" philosophy, African American congresspersons banned 
together in their war on discrimination. The Caucus produced a "Black 
Agenda" during this time that was used as a legislative resource by the I Caucus members as to the concerns of the black community (Clay, 1992; 
CBC, 1975). The Black Agenda was described by Amiri Baraka (1972); who I sat on the CBC foundation's board of directors, as an "attempt to define 
some of the essential changes which must take place in this land as we 
I 
I and our children move to self-determination and true independence... The 
American system does not work for the masses of our people, and it 
cannot be made to work without radical fundamental change... Both parties 
have betrayed us whenever their interests conflicted with ours, which 
was most of the time" (Clay, 1992; p.203). This manifesto tackled the I issues of federal and domestic assistance programs; full employment; tax 
reform; the budget and appropriations; universal voter registration;I general revenue sharing; health care; social insurance; education; and 
individual legislative initiatives (CBC, 1975). Over the years the CaucusI gradually integrated itself into the Washington political circuit and by the 
I 
1980s established itself as the most relentless supporter of the rights of 
minorities and the poor (Hatchet, 1986). Due to the 1990s round of 
I
 
redistricting, the CBC has reached a critical mass; unprecedented
 
challenges face the CBC. They must contend with the political and
 
ideological views of the vastly expanded membership and the possibility 
of internal and external Caucus conflicts of interest (Lusane, 1994; Clay, I 1992). With this potential conflict comes greater pressure for the 
members to vote along racial lines in order to obtain a high level of I cohesion. 
I Voting Cohesion 
I 
The membership of the CBC increased dramatically from the 102nd 
to the 103rd Congress; however, as mentioned previously, this was still a 
proportionately modest number for the countries largest minority of 
nearly 34 million (Census Bureau, 1996). Although the Caucuses may have I been small in proportion, their presence as a cohesive unified voting bloc 
I
 
I
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I 
traditionally has been used to compensate for their lack of numbers (Gile 
& Jones, 1995; Bositis, 1994; Jones, 1987). Author Susan Hammond (1983) 
notes that race is a pivotal factor in black congressional solidarity due in 
I 
part to the historical oppression experienced by African American 
citizens. Lucius Baker (1980), suggest that this common bond of the black 
I, 
experience is the catalyst for the high levels of cohesion exhibited by the 
CBC. These assessments are a logical explanation for the highly cohesive I voting behavior of the CBC through the years. However, political scientist 
Charles Jones (1987) emphasis that the racial bond of blackness alone is 
not the single factor of cohesion, citing party affiliation; the similarity 
of the constituency characteristics; and the ideology predisposition of 
I group members, as additional factors. Jones' mention of party affiliation was found to be a dominate factor in this study. 
Following the 1992 elections and the start of the 103rd Congress, I there was much speculation in the media and among Washington 
politicians as to whether Caucus members would vote collectively asI before, or whether the large influx of freshmen, women, and southern 
members might create dissension in the Caucus as a voting bloc (Gile & 
I Jones, 1995). Research has found that the CBC has continued to vote 
I 
cohesively over the last few years (Canon, 1995; Gile & Jones, 1995; 
Bositis, 1994). Voting cohesion research on the CBC is relatively new in 
comparison to the CBC' years of existence. The CBC, for a majority of its 
existence, was written off as weak and ineffective, existing as only aI	 peripheral entity within the House, and therefore generated little interest 
to a majority of researchers (Swain, 1993). The increase in membershipI that the late 1970s and 1980s signaled a shift in the CBC' visibility
 
(Loomis, 1981). There were an average of 15 CBC' members in the House
 
I through the 1970s and 21 through the 1980, with the 1990s being its
 
I
 
largest membership to date (Canon, 1995). Prior research of the CBC'
 
cohesive voting patterns of its formative years by researchers Levy &
 
I
 
Stoudinger (1976) revealed that although a high degree of solidarity was
 
demonstrated amongst the 92nd Caucus, in terms of substantive
 
accomplishments, the Caucus was essentially ineffective. However, many 
I
 
I
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I 
I 
sought to examine the continuality of the Caucus' allegiance over a longer 
period of time. I A CSC voting cohesion study conducted by Charles Jones (1987), 
examined the extent to which the CSC exhibited voting cohesion from the 
94th Congress through the 96th, by examining the voting patterns of the 
CSC across five different issue areas. Jones sought to prove that the CSC 
I would exhibit higher levels of cohesion than other informal organizations 
in the House of Representatives. The findings concluded that the CSC was 
I overwhelmingly cohesive in its voting behavior, and that cohesiveness 
was critical to their ability to operate as an effective force in the U.S. 
congressional arena. A more exhaustive study by political scientists GileI	 and Jones (1995) offers an examination of the CSC' voting cohesion 
beginning with the formative years of 1971 through 1990. Roll call votesI' over ten Congresses were examined. The results suggested that the CSC 
voted as a cohesive voting unit, with the exception of only one occasionI (Gile & Jones, 1995). The study further concluded that the overwhelming 
voting cohesion demonstrated by the CSC in its early years has continued 
I ( Gile & Jones, 1995). Researcher David Canon (1995) explored the new 
I 
found power of the CSC. He examined the impact of the new black minority 
majority CSC members on the power of the CSC; and the nature of black 
representation in those districts. He concluded that the new size of the 
cohesive CSC has substantially increased its political clout whileI	 simultaneously pushing it into the political mainstream; and that newly 
elected African Americans in Congress are more likely to promote the I politics of commonalty than the politics of difference (Canon, 1995). His 
conclusions were based on an examination of the CSC' role in passing 
I legislation, their patterns of roll call voting, committee assignments, and participation in the Democratic party leadership (Canon, 1995). Canon's 
research on CSC cohesion was consistent with previous research I pertaining to CSC cohesion. 
Researchers are becoming increasingly interested in the increasedI voting power of the CSC in its post Thornburg era. Researcher David 
Sositis (1994) examined the legislative voting records of the Caucus 
I
 
I
 
I 
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18 
members during the first session of the 103rd Congress, using interest 
group ratings and other devices. Caucus voting in 1993 was compared with 
Caucus voting in 1992, as well as with the voting patterns of House 
I 
Democrats. Bositis concluded that in 1992 there was a remarkable level of 
cohesion among Caucus members, except Republican Gary Frank (Bositis, 
1994). On Presidential support, support for the conservative coalition, and 
party unity, CBC members generally voted together, with noI differentiation between northern and southern voting behavior (Bositis, 
1994).I Bositis (1994) found a high degree of continuity evident in the 
I 
Caucus' voting records between the 102nd and the 103rd Congresses. On 
presidential support, support for the conservative coalition, and on party 
unity, CBC members generally voted together (Bositis, 1994). Bositis also 
made reference to the evaluative results conducted by various interest 
I 
I groups pertaining to the voting records of CBC members. The political 
interest group's study found that the voting records of CBC members in 
1993 were similar to those in 1992, though a slight shift in a more liberal 
direction may have developed (Bositis, 1994). The ratings of members on 
I economic, social, and foreign policy measures found the Caucus slightly 
I 
less liberal than in 1992, though still substantially liberal in its voting, 
with the exception of Franks (Bositis, 1994). The most intriguing change 
from 1992 to 1993 was in party unity, with Democrats as a group voting 
in a more cohesive bloc in 1993 than 1992 in the second session of the I 102nd Congress, the average Democrat supported the party on 79 percent 
of all votes, Caucus Democrats averaged slightly higher with 83 percent I (Bositis, 1994). In 1993, party unity voting among all House Democrats 
averaged 85 percent, and Caucus Democrats averaging 90 percent (Bositis, 
I 1994). A roll call analysis of 87 key House votes from the first session of 
I 
the 103rd Congress revealed that for certain types of legislation the 
Caucus was extremely cohesive with the CBC voting unanimously on 22 of 
I 
these votes (i.e. family planning, HUD) (Bositis, 1994). The Bositis study 
reinforces the previous research in the CBC' cohesion and party allegiance. 
I
 
I
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I Pivotal Bloc Voting 
I	 As mentioned previously there has been limited hard statistical research pertaining to the voting behavior of the CSC. In the 1990s 
I
 (particularly the 103rd CSC) the CSC has become a serious political voice,
 and they	 are becoming an organization that must be increasingly dealt 
with, due to their ability to influence legislation through their cohesive 
I voting bloc potential. Substantive data on the use of the CSC' cohesion as a 
pivotal voting bloc is also limited. Only since the seating of the 103rd 
I Congress has their been much interest in assessing the CSC' direct influence over the passage or rejection of House legislation. Research has 
shown that the 103rd Congress has had some success in using its numbers I	 to bloc and pass key legislation (Swain, 1996; Canon, 1995). At one time 
the House's attitude towards the CSC seemed to be: "Let them talk so weI can get back to business" (Hatchett, 1986; p. 19), viewing the Caucus only 
as a paper lion. With the CSC' incremental rise in numbers, came a new I and forced respect for the opinion of the African American 
I 
congresspersons. The words of former Caucus leader Kweisi Mfume are 
indicative of the caucuses new no-nonsense approach; "No longer are we 
I, 
going to be looked at as an addendum to the democratic agenda. We are 
going to be taken seriously. Anything short of partnership could prompt us 
to respond in kind. If that means killing an important piece of legislation, 
then that will be the case" (Lusane, 1994; p. 20), and they have done just I that. 
The 103rd CSC has played a pivotal role in shaping and then passing 
I House legislation on the budget, the space station, crime, and campaign 
I 
finance reform, making tough demands on behalf of their African American 
constituents (Swain, 1996, Canon, 1995). According to researcher David 
I 
Canon (1995) the 1993 budget was of particular salience to the CSC, 
unanimously threatening the survival of the legislation unless key 
I, 
revisions were made (Canon, 1995). They demanded increased funding for 
inner cities, the earned- income tax credit, food stamps, and mandatory 
immunization for poor children (Canon, 1995). Though the budget proposal 
was not amended to include all of the CSC' demands, they considered the I' 
I 
I
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I final budget concessions as a major victory for African Americans (Canon,
 
1995). The Caucus dealt a critical blow to President Clinton's crime bill,
I, when they, along with Republicans and conservative Democrats voted down
 
I
 
the rule needed to bring the crime bill to the House floor, however after
 
tough negotiations on the sentencing provisions, they were instrumental
 
.'
 
to its passage (Canon, 1995). The CBC was pivotal to the successful
 
passage of the space station, the nation's highest priced science project,
 
which survived by a single vote in 1993, and used its votes to protect PAC
 
contributions in the House's November 1993 campaign finance reform,

I which are critical to a black political candidate's ability to construct a
 
I
 
serious campaign (Canon,1995). The CBC is also helping promote
 
legislation on banking issues, welfare reform, and environmental justice
 
(dumping toxic waste in poor, black areas) (Canon, 1995 ). Now able to 
seriously influence legislation, the CBC is a force to be respected. 
I 
I As Canon demonstrates, the ability to deliver a bloc of votes 
enhances the bargaining leverage of the CBC ( Darden, 1984 ). Alan Fiellin 
(1984) notes that "Votes are a common medium of exchange in political 
bargaining and the ability to deliver a large block of votes may contribute 
I heavily in bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion (Darden,1984 ). 
I 
As such, the CBC demonstrated its ability to negotiate through its stalling 
of the 1993 Budget as mentioned previously. There are a number of ways 
I 
bloc voting can be construed as pivotal. One definition Canon (1995) cites 
is when the CBC would have "altered the outcome by switching their 
votes"; under this definition the CBC could have altered the outcome on 
186 of the 822 roll calls between January 5, 1993 and June 30, 1994 (p.I 165), Another definition of Canon's (1995) is when "the outcome of the 
vote would have changed if the member of the CBC would have abstained, I rather than voting in favor"; under this definition, the CBC played a pivotal 
I 
role on 56 of the 822 votes Canon examined (p. 165). However, for the 
purpose of this paper a third and most restrictive definition is employed. 
I 
I 
I 
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I
 RESEARCH DESIGN
 
I 
This study's hypothesis is: the votes of African American 
Congresspersons are more likely to be essential to the House passage of 
I 
policy issues salient to the African American populace, based on previous 
evidence. It is expected that both the 102nd and the 103rd CBC will be 
found to be a distinct voting bloc whose degree of cohesion is high. 
However,	 over all, their votes and high level of cohesion will have only a 
I	 minimal effect on the passage of policy issues salient to the black 
I 
community, due to a high level of voting cohesion exhibited by both the 
102nd and 103rd non-caucus House Democrats in the promotion of the 
I 
corresponding issues. To determine the CBC' operational success, the level 
of cohesion manifested by the Caucus on salient black issues and the 
occasions where CBC votes were essential (pivotal) to the outcome of the 
issues will be used as a gauge of the CBC' essentiality. CBC roll call votes I serve as the independent variable. A measure of cohesion and pivotal 
influence concerning issues salient to the Black community serve asI dependent variables. According to Jones (1987) CBC voting cohesion is 
I 
defined as "the extent to which members of a group vote in agreement 
with one another" (p. 29). Canon (1995) defines CBC voting as pivotal if 
"the outcome would have been reversed if their votes in favor of the 
winning side were subtracted and replaced with the average position ofI	 the non-Black Democrats who voted on the winning side of the bill" 
I (p. 167). These definitions will also apply in this study. To assess the level of voting cohesion and the pivotal voting bloc potential of the 102nd 
and 103rd Democratic Congress, an analysis of their voting behavior will 
I be based upon patterns in roll call votes selected from the Congressional 
Quarterly Report . Where previous studies have focused on the over all I, level of cohesion of the CBC members concerning all roll call legislation 
I 
over a given period of time, this study charts a new and narrower course 
by choosing roll call votes of the Democratic Congresses that pertain to 
issues of concern to Black America in particular, as deemed so by the CBC' 
self proclaimed "Black Agenda" and determining if those votes wereI	 pivotal to the passage of the particular legislation (Clay, 1992; CBC, 
1975). The operational rules employed to select the roll call votes were: 
I
 
I
 
I 
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I
 1. Only the roll call votes involved the passage of Amendments,
 
I 
committee reports and legislation salient to the African American 
populous are to be examined. 
I 
2. Since voting agreement is being determined, usually unanimous 
votes are not considered because the level of agreement cannot be 
effectively determined in the absence of disagreement(Gile & Jones, 
1995). However, for this study unanimous votes will be considered I because this study seeks to examine the CBC' pivotal voting bloc 
potential, which most likely will require the unanimous vote of the 
I CBC. 3.	 The roll call votes of House Republican and CBC member Gary Franks 
will not be considered in accessing CBC cohesion or pivotal voting of 
I 
I either Caucuses, because Franks is an atypical member. For, the CBC 
never votes with a majority of the Republicans on pivotal issues 
(Canon, 1995). 
I	 A total of 6153 House Democratic roll call votes were considered 
I 
and were categorized into three major issue areas and covered votes on 
the following policy dimensions (similar to Gile & Jones, 1985, Levey & 
Stroudinger, 1976, and to Jones, 1987, each of whom used four or five): 
I General	 District of Columbia, motor voter, foreign affairs 
a Social	 civil rights and liberties, education, benefits, law and 
order issues 
I 
Monetary appropriations (not specifically related to anotherI, issue area) and other monetary or fiscal issues 
I	 Because different policy issues might expectantly produce different 
I 
voting patterns of cohesion, selected roll call votes were categorized into 
the three issue areas. This categorization will prove useful in this study 
because references to a particular group's overall cohesion in certain 
policy areas will be made. 
I
 
I
 
I
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I Scores for group cohesion were calculated according to the Rice 
I 
Index of Cohesion (Rice, 1969). The index has a range of 0 to 100 based on 
the following formula: 
I
 ("yes" votes - 'no" votes )
 
I,
 Total number of votes
 
A measure of cohesion is defined as "the degree of departure from 
I the most probable chance distribution of votes (Le. 50-50, which yields a 
I 
score of zero); hence maximum cohesion (100) is attained whenever the 
group is in total agreement or total disagreement" (Rice, 1969; P. 208). A 
I 
high level of agreement is defined as a cohesion score between 75 and 
100; a low level was defined as less than 50 (Gile & Jones, 1995). The 
average cohesion for each issue was calculated (for each Caucus) by 
summing the individual roll calls and dividing the number of votes perI issue. A comprehensive average score per issue area will be calculated by 
summing the individual roll calls (of each Caucus)in a given issue area and 
I dividing the number of votes per issue area. Cohesion scores for the non-Caucus House Democrats were also 
calculated and used to gauge the extent of support to which the non-CSC I members gave the corresponding legislation salient to African Americans 
using the above method. I The objective of this study is not to make sweeping empirical 
conclusions about the Caucus' ability to legislate on behalf of African 
I Americans. In light of the recent controversy surrounding the new 
minority majority districts, this study seeks only make a limited 
I assessment of the two Congresses directly involved in the race 
redistricting debate, to determining whether the votes of the African 
American congresspersons are even necessary to pass House issues I salient to the African American community. 
I
 
I
 
I
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I Table 1 
I Cohesion Scores: all Issue Areas 
I. Issue Non­
CBC Democrats 
I Congress Area Issues N Mean N Mean 
I 102nd 
I (1991-1992) Social HR 3371 18 66.6 239 41.4 
I HR 1 HR 3040 24 24 100. 100. 241 228 87.5 84.2 
I HR 3033 HR2 23 24 100. 83.3 239 238 100. 96.6 
HR7 24 91.6. 163 91.4 
I 
I Monetary HR 4210 HeR 121 24 22 50.0 90.9 241 235 66.8 70.2 
I HR 2100 HR 2519 17 24 100 83.3 215 228 .8 7.8 
HR 1281 23 100 233 76.9 
I 
I General HR 3844 HR 2508 24 24 100 100 208 131 67.3 57.2 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Cohesion Scores: all Issue Areas 
I 
I
 Issue Non­
CBC Democrats 
Congress Area Issues N Mean N MeanI 
---------------------------------------------------------­
103rd
 
I (1993-1994)
 
I 
Social HR 920 37 100 209 80.8 
HR 3351 36 100 213 92.6 
I 
HR 670 37 89.1 212 75.4 
HR 1025 37 94.5 216 37.0 
I 
HR1 36 100 217 73.2 
HR 1804 37 100 218 99.0 
103rd 
I (1993-1994)Monetary HR 2264 37 100 221 62.6 
HR 3400 37 100 221 48.4 
I 
I General HR4 33 51.5 209 69.3 HR 51 37 100 219 41.0 
HR2 37 100 215 91.1I SJR 45 36 100 212 91.5 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Table 2 
I 
I 
Social
 
102nd
 
HR 3371. the Fairness in Death and Sentencing Act. This amendment 
sought to replace the Fairness in Death Sentencing Act, which allows minorities to challenge a I death sentence as discriminatory if statistics show a disproportionate number of their race 
being condemned to die, with the Equal Justice Act, which prohibits the consideration of race in 
I determining a defendant's sentence and the use of statistics to invalidate a sentence. The 
substitution was adopted 223-191. 
I 
I 
HR 1. Civil Rights Act of 19911Passage. This bill sought to reverse or modify a 
series of Supreme Court rUlings that narrowed the reach and remedies of job discrimination 
laws and two authorize compensatory and punitive for victims of discrimination based on sex, 
religion or disability. The bill passed 273-158. I 
HR 3040. Unemployment Benefits ExtensionlPassage. This bill sought to 
I permanently extend unemployment benefits to long-term unemployed workers for up to 20 
additional weeks. It passed 283-125. 
I 
I HR 3033. Job Training Partnership actlPassage. This bill is aimed at 
retraining economically disadvantaged individuals who are unprepared to compete in the job 
market. It passed 420-6. 
I HR 2. Family and Medical Leave ActlRule. This bill sought adoption of the rule 
(H Res 275) to provide for House consideration of the bill to require workers with more than 
I 50 employees to provide up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave a year for serious illness, to care 
for a new child, to care for a seriously ill child, spouse or parent. It was adopted 269-156. 
I 
I 
HR 7. Handgun Waiting PeriodlPassage. This bill requires a seven day waiting 
period for gun purchases, allowing local law enforcement authorities to check the background of 
prospective buyers to determine whether they have a criminal record. It passed. 239-186. 
I
 
I
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103rd 
I HR 920. Unemployment Benefits Extension/Passage. A bill to provide $5.7 
I 
billion to allow for the processing of claims from March 6 through Ocl. 2 for federal extended 
emergency unemployment benefits. It passed 254-161. 
I HR 3351. Youth Offenders alternative Punishment/Passage. This bill authorizes $200 million per year for fiscal year 1994-96 in grants to states for alternative 
punishment programs, it passed 336-82. I 
HR 670. Family Planning Amendments/Passage. This bill codifies the Clinton 
I administration's lifting of the "gag rule" that prohibited staff at federally funded clinics from 
discussing abortion. It passed 273-149. 
I 
I 
HR 1025. Brady Bill/Passage. Passage of this bill requires a five-business-day 
waiting period before an individual could purchase a handgun to allow official to run a 
background check. It passed 238-189. 
I HR 1. Family and Medical Leave/Passage. This bill requires employers of more 
than 50 employees to provide twelve weeks of unpaid leave for illness or to care for a new child 
I or sick family member. It passed 265-163. 
I HR 1804. School Improvement/Substitute. This substitution amendment would 
I 
allow local communities to define "school choice" to include private schools; require 25 percent 
of federal funds to be spent on school choice programs by school districts and add provisions to 
strengthen parental control of education. It was rejected 130-300. 
I Monetary 
102nd 
I 
I 
HR 4210. 1992 Tax Bill/passage. This bill sought to increase taxes on the rich, 
while lowering taxes for the poor by giving workers a temporary tax credit worth up to 
$400.00 per couple and $200.00 for individuals a year. It passed 221-209. 
I
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H Con Res 121. Fiscal 1992 Budget Resolution/Education Increases. This 
amendment sought to increase the budget authority target for education, training, employment 
I and social services by $400 million and the outlay target by $200 million, permitting 
I
 
additional funding for Head Start, chapter 1 Compensatory Education, student financial aid,
 
vocational and adult education and job corp. It was adopted 261-158.
 
I
 HR 2100. Fiscal 1992 Defense Authorization/SOl. This amendment sought to
 terminate the Strategic Defense Initiative program and permit only a basic SDI research 
program funded at $1.1 billion. It was rejected 118-266. 
I 
HR 2519. Fiscal 1992 HUD Appropriations/Restore Space station 
I Funding. This amendment sought to provide $1.9 billion for the space station Freedom and to 
cut $217 million from public housing operating subsidies. It was adopted 240-173. 
I 
I 
HR 1281. Fiscal 1991 Supplemental Appropriations/Housing. This 
amendment sought to provide $500 million for the HOME program (Home Investment 
Partnership), and $165 million for Hope (Home ownership and Opportunity for people 
everywhere). It was rejected 177-240.I 
103 rd 
I 
I 
HR 2264. Fiscal 1993 BUdget Reconciliation/Passage. The bill sought to 
reduce the deficit by an estimated $496 billion over five years through almost $242 billion in 
additional taxes and $225 billion in spending cuts. It was passed 219-213. 
I HR 3400. Reinventing Government and Spending Cuts/ Penny-Kaslch 
Amendment. an amendment to cut federal spending by $90 billion over five years through I various proposals, including Medicare and other entitlement programs. It was rejected 213­
219. 
I 
I 
General
 
102nd
 
I
 
I
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reparation of Haitians who were in the custody of the united states before Feb. 5, 1992. The bill 
I passed 217-165. 
I HR 2508. Fiscal 1992-93 Foreign Aid Authorization/South Africa. T his 
I 
substitute amendment prohibits aid to South African Communist Party and to any organization 
or association affiliated with a communist party and to require the president to ensure that 
recipients of aid have democratic processes in place for selecting leaders and do not have a 
record of human rights abuses. It was adopted 279-134. 
I 
103rd 
I 
I 
HR 4. National Institutes of Health Reauthorization/Instruct Conferees. A 
motion to instruct the House conferees to agree to the senate amendment to prevent the 
permanent immigration of persons infected with the HIV virus, namely Haitians. It passed 356­
I 58. 
HR 51. DC. Statehood/Passage. This bill would admit the District of Columbia into I the union as the state of New Columbia. It was rejected 153-277. 
I HR 2 National motor -Voter Registration/Conference Report. The adoption 
I 
of the conference report on the bill to require states to allow citizens to register to vote when 
they are applying for a driver's license, at any agency providing public assistance, and through 
the mail. It was adopted 259-164. 
I S J Res 45. Somalia Troop Authorization/Passage. Passage of the bill to 
authorize under War Powers Resolution the previous deployment of U.S. Troops in Somalia and I to authorize for one year after enactment the continued U.S. participation in a U.N. led 
peacekeeping mission in Somalia. It passed 243-179. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I 
·See Tables 1 & 2 for group cohesion scores and a 
description of the issues 
I SOCIAL 102nd 
I The fairness in Death and Sentencing Act was adopted 223­
191. This issue is extremely controversial because a disproportionate 
I
 
I number of defendants sentenced to death are African Americans (Barkan,
 
1994). However, there appears to be a considerable amount of
 
disagreement among the Caucus members present in the roll call votes.
 
I 
The CBC with a cohesion score of 66.6, did not satisfy the minimum 
criterion (75-100) designating a high level of voting cohesion. Non-CaucusI Democrats, with a voting cohesion score of 41.4, exhibit an surprisingly 
low level of agreement on this issue. The lack of cohesion by both the CBC 
and non-CBC Democrats contribute to the adoption of this legislation. The 
CBC would not have played a pivotal role in the passage of this issue 
I regardless of its ability to exhibit a cohesion score of 66.6 or even a 
perfect score of 100. 
I The CBC' cohesion score for the Civil Rights Act of 1991, is 100., 
which is consistent with their self-proclaimed fight for additional 
African American civil rights (Hatchett, 1993). The non-CBC DemocratsI also exhibit a high level of voting agreement with a score of 87.5. The 
Amendment passed 273-158. The cohesion level of the CBC has no direct I bearing on the passage of this issue, for it would have passed with or 
without any of the CBC members voting in favor of it. I Unemployment is a big concerns of the CBC members and their 
constituents, for a disproportionate number of the unemployed are African 
I American (Jenson, 1994)). The Unemployment benefits Extension 
I 
I 
Passage bill passed 283-125, with unanimous support from the CBC. This 
legislation was also salient amongst non-CBC Democrats, with a cohesion 
score of 84.2. The unanimous bloc of CBC votes are not pivotal to the 
passage of this legislation, due to the non-CBC' high level of cohesion. 
I
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I 
I As mention previously unemployment is extremely salient to CBC 
members and their constituents. The Job Training Partnership 
Act/Passage sailed through the House with a vote of 420-6. The CBC and 
non-CBC democrats both exhibit a cohesion score of 100. This high level of 
cohesion emphasizes the Democratic parties commitment to theI unemployed or unemployable. Because of the Houses unanimous agreement 
on this issue, the cohesive voting bloc of the CBC is not pivotal to the I passage of this issue. 
African Americans have become the fastest growing population in 
I 
I the United states (Census Bureau, 1996). With the growth of the Black 
family the CBC has continuously voiced its commitment to the upliftment 
of the Black family. Therefore, it was surprising to uncover the erratic 
I 
voting behavior of the Caucus members pertaining to the Family and 
Medical Leave Act/Rule. The rule passed 269-156, but not without 
opposition from CBC members. though they exhibit a high level of voting 
cohesion with a score of 83.3. This study had expected to uncover a I unanimous bloc of votes. The non-CBC Democrats championed the cause 
superbly with a score of 96.6. With the high level of voting cohesion I demonstrated by the non-CBC Democrats, the votes of the CBC, regardless 
of the level of cohesion, are not pivotal to the passage of the issue. 
I Gun violence has reached epidemic proportions in the African 
American community (Henderson, 1993). African American constituents 
are demanding that their congresspersons take action against the violence I	 that rages in their communities. Therefore, it was no surprise that the 
CBC placed considerable value in the Hand Gun Waiting I	 Period/Passage, by exhibiting a cohesion score of 91.6. The bill passed 
by a vote of 239-186, with little opposition from House Democrats, whoI also reached a high level of agreement with a score of 91.4. Because of the 
high level of voting cohesion exhibited by non-caucus Democrats, the 
I votes of the CBC are again not pivotal to the passage of the legislation. 
103rd 
I 
I Employment issues were also salient to the Democratic House 
members of the 103rd Congress. The Unemployment Benefits 
I
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I 
I Extension/Passage was passed 254-161. The CSC members voted 
unanimously in favor of the bills passage; while the non-CSC democrats 
also exhibit a high level of cohesion with a score of 80.8. No votes of the 
CSC are pivotal to the passage of this legislation; due in part to the 
cohesiveness of the non-CSC Democrats. I Youth offenders constitute a majority of criminal offenders in the 
United States (Duster, 1987). Secause a substantial number of criminal I offenders are African American (Duster, 1987), the Youth Offender 
Alternative Punishment bill would be very important to the African 
I 
I American populous. The bill passed 336-82 with the CSC exhibiting a 
perfect score of cohesion. The level of non-CSC democrat cohesion was 
extremely high with a score of 96.2. Again, the CSC voting bloc is not 
critical to the outcome of this legislation. 
Unexpected pregnancy is a problem prevalent amongst African I American teenage women (Jacob, 1994). Therefore, the Family Planning 
Amendments/Passage is important to many in the African AmericanI community because it allows physicians to discuss the procedure of 
abortion as an alternative to carrying a fetus to full term. The bill passedI 273-149. The CSC reached a high level of agreement on this issue with a 
score of 89.1. The non-CSC Democrats also reached a high level of 
I agreement exhibiting a cohesion score of 75.4. The High level of voting 
cohesion amongst the non-CSC Democrats was sufficient to pass the 
legislation without any assistance from the Caucus.I The CSC continued its support for gun control in the 103rd Congress 
with its highly cohesive score of 94.5 pertaining to the Srady BillI passage 238-189. The support by non-Caucus Democrats took a sharp dive 
from that of the 103rd's support for gun control. The non-Caucus I Democrats exhibit a cohesion score of 37.0. However, their low level of 
cohesion was countered by a high level of voting cohesion from House 
I Republicans, so high, that the votes of CSC member are not pivotal to the 
I 
I 
passage of the bill. 
The Family and medical Leave bill received full support from the 
103rd Caucus contrary to the rule vote of the 102nd, with a cohesion 
score of 100. The non-Caucus Democrats exhibit a moderate level of 
I
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voting agreement with a cohesion score of 72.2. The bill passed 265-163. 
The votes of the CBC are not pivotal to the passage of this legislation. 
The idea of school choice has become a hot issue in the 1990s. The 
defeat of the School Improvement /Substitute was a top priority of 
the CBC members because of the negative impact it could have on theI	 public school system, where a majority of African American children are 
taught. The amendment was rejected 130-300, with the CBC voting I unanimously and the non-CSC Democrats also exhibiting a high level of 
cohesion with a score of 99.0 on the issue. The unanimous voting bloc of 
I the CBC are not pivotal to the passage of this issue. 
I MONETARY 102nd 
A large percentage of African Americans are designatej as low orI low to middle income wage earners (Lusane, 1994). The CBC has always 
sought to reduce the economic strain African Americans have experience I in the U.S. economic system, the 1992 Tax Bill does just that by 
lowering the taxes of the indigent. The measure passed 221-209, but 
I surprisingly, not without considerable opposition from CBC members. The 
CBC exhibits a low level of voting cohesion on this issue with a score of 
I 50.0. The non-CSC Democrats are a bit more cohesive with a score of 66.8, 
still falling short of the high cohesion designation. Because of the 
moderate level of support for this issue by non-CSC Democrats, the CBC I became pivotal to the passage of this legislation. The bill passed by a vote 
of 221-209. Democrats supported the measure by a 219-46 margin with I	 the CSC voting in favor (19-5). Therefore, non-CSC Democrats supported 
the bill by 200-46 margin. If the CBC members would have voted for the 
I 
I bill by a 7-17 margin, the bill would have been defeated 209-221. 
Education and training are crucial issue of the CSC' agenda. The 
CSC has been know to be the champion of educational programs such as the 
I 
Head Start program and adult education. Therefore the Fiscal 1992 
Budget Resolution/Education Increase was a top priority of the CSCI which is demonstrated by their highly cohesive voting score of 90.9. The 
non-CSC Democrats place a moderate level of value in the passage of this 
I
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I 
I amendment with a score of 70.2. The Amendment passed 261-158. Not one 
of the CSC votes is pivotal to the passage of this legislation. 
The CSC has been extremely vocal in its condemnation of excessive 
defense appropriations. Therefore it is no surprise that they exhibit a 
perfect score of cohesion in support of the Fiscal 1992 DefenseI Authorization/SOl amendment that would have cut defense spending. 
The non-CSC members were rigidly set against the possibly of defense I cuts, exhibiting a extremely low cohesion score of .8. The Amendment was 
rejected 118-226, due to the non-Caucus Democrat's lack of support on 
I this issue. 
I 
Acquiring affordable housing can be a major problem for many 
African Americans. Therefore the defeat of the Fiscal 1992 HUD 
Appropriations Amendment, which sought to cut millions in public 
housing appropriations, was an important issue for many African I	 Americans. The CSC exhibits a high level of voting agreement with a score 
of 83.3. conversely, the non-CSC Democrats exhibit an extremely low level I	 of voting agreement with a score of 07. The amendment was adopted 240­
173, due to the lack of value the non-CSC democrats placed in the passage I of the legislation. 
The fiscal 1991 Supplemental Appropriations/housing 
I amendment was an important issue to African Americans for the same 
I 
reason listed above. The CSC voted unanimously in favor of the amendment 
and the non-CSC democrats also exhibit a high level of agreement with a 
cohesion score of 76.9. However, the legislation was rejected 177-240, in 
part because of strong Republican opposition. I 
103 rdI The Fiscal Year 1993 Budget Reconciliation/Passage sought 
to enact substantial spending cuts that would have had far reaching 
I affects in the African American community. However, the CSC exhibits a highly cohesive score of 100, supporting the passage of the issue after 
intense negotiations that revised the bill to be more sensitive to the poor. 
I 
I The non-CSC Democrats demonstrate a moderate level of voting cohesion 
with a score of 62.6. Secause of the non-CSC Democrat's moderate 
I
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I 
I support, the cohesive CSC became pivotal to the passage of the bill. The 
issue was adopted 219-213. Democrats supported the bill by a 219-38 
margin, with the CSC unanimously in favor (37-0). Therefore non-CSC 
I 
Democrats supported the bill by a 182-38 margin. If the CSC members 
would have voted for the bill 31-6, the bill would have been defeated 213­
219. 
The Penny-Kasich Amendment, like the 1993 budget bill soughtI to cut spending in a way that would have dramatically affected the poor. 
The CSC mobilized against the amendment exhibiting a perfect score of 
I cohesion. the non-CSC Democrats however, exhibit a low level of 
I 
agreement with a score of 48.4. The low level of salience the non-CSC 
Democrats afford this issue, resulted in the cohesive CSC becoming a 
pivotal player in the defeat of the amendment. The amendment was 
rejected 213-219. The Democrats supported the issue 57-200 with theI CSC unanimously rejecting the Amendment 0-37. Therefore the non-CSC 
Democrats supported the issue by a 57-163 margin. If the CSC would have I voted 6-31 the bill would have survived 219-213. 
I GENERAL 
102nd 
I The plight of black people out side of North America has always been 
of concern to the CSC and their constituents. From the plight of Haitian 
refugees to the economic and social condition of African people, has I caused the CSC has lead the way in the protection of the people of these 
lands (Canon, 1995). The Haitian refugee Protection legislation andI the Fiscal 1992-93 Foreign Aid authorizationl South African 
amendment, were two issues that were voted on unanimously by the CSC, I passing 217-165 and 279-134 respectively. However, the non-CSC 
Democrats scored considerably lower with a cohesion score of 67.3 for 
I Haitian protections and 57.2 for South African aid. Though the non-CSC 
I 
level of agreement was low, the voting bloc of the CSC is not pivotal to 
the outcome of the issues. 
I
 
I
 
I 
I Congressional Slack Caucus 
I 
I 
36 
103rd 
As mentioned previously, the CSC has vowed its commitment to the 
plight of blacks not only in the United States, but in other countries as 
well. The National Institutes of Health Reauthorization/Instruct 
Conferees preventing HIV positive immigrants, namely Haitians, fromI entering the United States, passed 356-58. In spite the CSC' previous 
support of Haitian matters, it seemed to be divided over the issueI exhibiting a moderate to low level cohesion score of 51.5. The non-CSC 
members were a bit more cohesive than the CSC with a cohesion score of 
I 69.3 The votes of the CSC are not pivotal to the passage of this issue. 
I 
The African American population of Washington DC. is now over 
65.0% of District's population (Census Sureau, 1996). Having gone its 
entire existence without voting representation in Congress, the push for 
DC. statehood has continued to grow just as the black population has. DC. I Statehood has been an important issue among CSC members and African 
Americans. Lately the possibility of Jesse Jackson being elected to theI Senatorial seat upon the admission of the District of Columbia as a union 
state, has sparked renewed interest in the status of DC. amongst Slacks 
I (Walker, 1992). The CSC members exhibit a perfect cohesion score of 100. 
I 
on the issue. However, the non-CSC Democrats exhibit extremely low 
voting agreement pertaining to the passage with a score of 41.0. The bill 
was rejected 153-277. The unanimous votes of the CSC are not pivotal to 
the outcome of the bills passage. I The National Motor -Voter Registration/Conference Report 
was adopted 259-164. This adoption was important to the CSC as aI procedural step in the fight to make voter registration more accessible to 
the African Americans electorate (Dreier, 1994). The CSC voted 
I 
I unanimously in favor of the legislation and the non-CSC Democrats also 
exhibit a high level of voting agreement with a cohesion score of 91.1. 
With the high level of non-CSC voting agreement, the voting bloc of the 
CSC members is not pivotal to the passage of this issue. 
As mentioned earlier the social and economic condition of African I people are of great concern to CSC members. The Somalia Troop 
authorization/Passage was supported by CSC members unanimously.I
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I The non-CBC members also exhibit a high level of voting agreement with a 
I 
cohesion score of 91.5. The votes of the CBC members are not essential to 
the passage of this bill. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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I CONCLUSIONS 
I	 The findings of this study support my expectation that the votes of the African American congresspersons are essential to the House passage 
of policy issues salient to the African American community. Overall, theI	 102nd CBC is highly cohesive in the social (75.7) and general (100.) areas; 
and exhibit a low level of cohesion in the monetary (54.5) area. The 103rd I CBC overall is highly cohesive in the monetary (100.) area; but exhibit a 
moderate level of cohesion in the social (63.6) and general (65.0) areas. 
I The 102nd non-CBC Democrats are highly cohesive in the social (98.3) and 
I 
monetary (88.5) areas; and exhibit a overall low level of cohesion in the 
general (63.4) area. The 103rd non-CBC Democrats are highly cohesive in 
the monetary (97.9) area; and exhibit a low over all level of cohesion in 
the social (45.6) and general (65.5) areas. These erratic levels of overall I	 cohesion exhibited by the CBC are inconsistent with this study's 
expectations. The study had expected to find a high level of cohesion inI Virtually every policy area of black concern. This expectation was based 
on the conclusions of previous studies demonstrating high levels of 
I cohesion by the CBC members over the years. 
I 
This study's assertion that African American congresspersons are 
essential to the House passage of policy issue salient to the Black 
community, is supported by the votes of the 102nd CBC members being 
pivotal to the passage of the Tax Bill; and the votes of the 103rd CBC I members being pivotal to the passage of the 1993 Budget and the Penny­
Kasich Amendment. However, these three occasions that the CBC' votes I were pivotal could be considered by many to be American concerns and not 
particularly African American concerns. 
I Though the CBC was pivotal on the previously mentioned occasions, 
I 
the non-eBC Democrats, functioning at various levels of cohesion, were 
overwhelmingly responsible for the passage of a majority of the issue 
salient to African Americans. Undoubtedly because a majority of the 
African Americans electorate affiliate themselves with the DemocraticI	 Party, Democrats have become more willing to support policy issues of 
I
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I 
concern to African American populace (Whitby, 1987). This data could lead 
this study to conclude that though the votes of black congresspersons 
were pivotal on occasions, they are not essential to ensure House passage 
of a majority of policy issues salient to the African American community; 
for non-CSC Democrats do an adequate job of promoting and preserving I issues salient to the African American populous. 
However, this study also reveals that the 102nd CSC ended up on theI losing side of four issues and the numerically inflated 103rd ended up on 
the losing end on two occasion. Of the six issues that the CSC lost, the 
I Fairness in Sentencing Act, defense cuts, HUD appropriation reductions, 
I 
housing appropriation, HIV immigrants and DC. statehood, three of the 
issues are particularly black oriented. The Fairness in Sentencing Act, HIV 
immigrants and DC. statehood all have a direct affect on black people in 
particu lar.I The 103rd CSC was more successful in its promotion of salient 
black issues than the 102nd CSC, in part because of its increased I membership. If the 103rd Caucus had remained at its previous 102nd 
membership status, the 24 voting members, regardless of their level of 
I cohesion, would not have played a pivotal role in the passage of any of the 
I 
legislation considered. 
Non-CSC Democrats failed to support the CSC on issues that were of 
greatest concern to black people. Therefore, based on these findings this 
study concludes that not only are the votes of CSC members necessary, but I more African American congresspersons, who are sensitive to black 
issues and who are willing to vote cohesively with the CSC, are needed to I seriously promote and preserve legislation of the most importance to 
African Americans. 
I Future research to ascertain the level of voting support, prior to 
I 
redistricting, Caucasian Representatives of the controversial minority 
majority districts gave to policy issues salient to the Slack community 
would be beneficial. This research would assist in the determination of 
whether it is necessary to have African American representatives in orderI to receive unconditional voting support for policy issues of African 
American concern.I
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